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Independence or unification with Russia? That is a question that is constantly present in the 
South Ossetian public space. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, two referendums have 
been held in South Ossetia on the issue of state sovereignty (in 1992 and 2006). Since 2015, many 
proclamations have been made by South Ossetian politicians about preparations for another 
referendum on the subject. In the case of South Ossetia, what one would think as dichotomous 
ideas – independence and unification with Russia – are in fact overlapping concepts. The aim 
of this paper is to contribute to a closer understanding of the puzzling current reality in South 
Ossetia in terms of the debate on unification versus independence. On the one hand, South 
Ossetia seeks independence, but on the other, it is constantly seeking to join Russia. The 
second goal of the paper is to identify the factors, which underlie the South Ossetian discourse 
supporting the idea of unification with the Russian Federation. As a result of the analysis, 
the author concludes that the issue of security and the idea of a divided nation play a crucial 
role in this discourse. These topics frequently appear in the statements of the South Ossetian 
political elite as the main arguments in favour of accession to Russia. In addition, there are 
several other important variables, which can explain this prevailing South Ossetian narrative: 
the lack of human and natural resources for a viable state, the fatigue of the South Ossetian 
population in the face of the incompetence of local elites, and their aspiration for Russian 
centralisation. Finally, because a fuzzy independence narrative has also been documented in 
other de facto states, the author seeks an answer to a more general question: Why does this 
overlap in the narrative of independence versus unification arise in de facto states?
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Introduction
Social science research focusing on the post-Soviet space has traditionally mentioned South Ossetia 
as an example of a de facto state.1 Though various scholars give different definitions of de facto 
statehood,2 one part of the definition that is usually present is the idea that a de facto state actively 
seeks broad international recognition of its sovereignty, yet receives such recognition either not 
at all or only to a very limited extent. However, in the case of South Ossetia,3 the question of an 
*       E-mail: tomas.hoch@osu.cz
1       Following Pegg (1998), Kolstø (2006), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), or Hoch, Kopeček and Baar (2017), the author of this 
paper considers de facto states to be regions that have a defined state territory, permanent population and their governments 
are in control of the entire territory they claim, or at least most of it. The state authorities perform state administration, have 
the capacity to enter into relations with other states, and they have been seeking independence for at least two years, while 
failing to gain international recognition of their independence (or they have been recognized by only a few countries).
2       However, as Pegg rightly points out, 'disagreements come only around the edges of the definition, while not disputing 
the basic elements of it … and a fairly widespread consensus exists among scholars about the basic elements of how to define 
a de facto state' (Pegg, 2008, p. 1).
3       Since the 2017 referendum, the official name of the de facto state has been 'Republic of South Ossetia–State of Alania'. For 
the sake of brevity and clarity the author uses the term South Ossetia in this text. Because this de facto state is internationally 
recognized only by five UN member states (Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria), government positions and other 
political functions should be preceded by the phrase 'de facto' (e.g. de facto President, de facto Prime Minister or de facto 
Parliament). However, in this text the author omits this phrase when referring to these positions and functions. This does not 
reflect the author’s political preferences in any way; the purpose is merely to maximize the legibility and simplicity of the text.
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active effort to seek international recognition is not so obvious. Compared to Abkhazia, the second 
breakaway region of Georgia, where the independence narrative has been deeply rooted in the 
public space since the war at the beginning of the 1990s (e.g. Jones, 2014; Hoch, 2018; or Smith, 
2018), in South Ossetia the entire question of independence is much more complicated and has 
varied over time. 
Figure 1: Map of South Ossetia
Source: Hoch and Kopeček (2020), p. 87
After the all-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation, held in 
March 1991, another two referendums on the question of state sovereignty were held in South 
Ossetia. The first referendum was held in 1992. Voters answered two questions: “Do you agree 
that South Ossetia should be an independent country?” and “Do you agree with the South Ossetian 
Parliament’s solution of 1 September 1991 on reunion with Russia?” The overwhelming majority of 
voters (more than 99%) answered both questions in the affirmative. The second referendum was 
held in 2006, when the majority of the population chose to remain independent. Voters were 
asked the question: “Should the Republic of South Ossetia retain its current status as an independent 
state, and be recognised by the international community?” (Lomsadze, 2015). At first sight, the 
results of the first referendum appear to be mutually incompatible with the results of the second 
referendum. State independence should, by its very nature, mean something qualitatively different 
than unification with Russia. However, as will be demonstrated later in this text, in the case of 
South Ossetia these apparently dichotomous ideas – independence and unification within Russia 
– in fact overlap.
In a rare independent survey of South Ossetian political opinions in 2010 carried out by John 
O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal, over 80% of respondents expressed the desire for 
union with the Russian Federation (O’loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal, 2014). The idea of unification with 
Russia has been present in South Ossetian historiography since the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
(Skakov, 2011). As demonstrated by the results for the second question in the 1992 referendum, it 
has also been part of the local political agenda since that time. On 19 October 2015, the President of 
South Ossetia, Leonid Tibilov, announced that he was planning to conduct a referendum on South 
Ossetia's accession to Russia (RES, 2015). Since late 2015, South Ossetian politicians have made many 
proclamations about preparations for another referendum on the subject. It is not only the questions 
in the referendums that have changed during the past three decades, but also the attitudes of local 
elites in South Ossetia. Their approaches have oscillated from sovereignty and independence, through 
joining the Russian Federation as an autonomous republic, to unification with North Ossetia-Alania 
and the creation of a joint republic that would be part of the Russian Federation.
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The aim of this paper is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the current puzzling reality in 
South Ossetia in terms of the debate on unification versus independence – on the one hand, South 
Ossetia seeks independence, but on the other, it is constantly seeking to join Russia. The second 
goal of the paper is to identify the factors underlying the prevailing South Ossetian discourse 
supporting the idea of unification with the Russian Federation.4
 
The article is based on the South Ossetian political elite’s official statements on the issue of 
independence and unification with Russia. Data sources include the Foreign Ministry of the 
Republic of South Ossetia, South Ossetia’s press agencies, and news articles from Eurasian news 
outlets. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part is intended as a brief overview of the 
research, focusing on the phenomenon of fluctuating independence narratives in de facto states. 
The second part describes the narrative of the so-called 'three genocides'5  – a narrative which is 
constantly present in the South Ossetian public space, and which undermines the willingness of 
the South Ossetian population to share the same state with Georgians. The third part reviews 
current political preferences in South Ossetia regarding independence or accession to the Russian 
Federation. Based on these empirical findings from the South Ossetian case, the more general issue 
of a definition for de facto states and the conditions required for the fluctuating independence 
narratives are discussed in the conclusion.
Independence narratives in de facto states: overview of the research
The failure to find a solution to prolonged conflicts in de facto states represents a problem not only 
in the economic and political sphere, but also for social development and international security. 
It is therefore unsurprising that during the past quarter of a century, de facto statehood has been 
an important area of research among political scientists, geographers, experts in security studies, 
international relations, and area studies. One of the first authors who attempted to present a 
systematic theoretical account of the existence of de facto states in the international environment 
was Scott Pegg. His monograph 'International Society and the De facto State' (1998) structurally 
focused on issues related to the contested status of these entities. With a certain degree of 
generalisation, it could be said that researchers at the turn of the millennium mostly focused on 
case studies exploring the roots of separatist conflicts, the possibilities for conflict resolution and 
on the external relations of de facto states. The internal dynamics of development in unrecognised 
states has been somewhat neglected by researchers, and these issues only began to gain more 
attention around 2005–2008 (Caspersen, 2008a). To a large extent this shift in focus is due to the 
fact that de facto states are no longer considered as merely a passing phenomenon and that these 
entities are capable of existing for a relatively long period of time, despite their complete (or 
almost complete) lack of international recognition.6 The second reason for the growth of academic 
interest in the internal dynamics of development is the fact that access to these territories has 
4       It is important to mention that the Georgian refugees from South Ossetia and the Georgian community who remained are 
not included in this analysis of domestic debates in South Ossetia. The main reason is that the Georgian community (whether 
currently outside the administrative border line or inside South Ossetia) has, after the war in 2008, no voice and real power to 
influence the local narrative in South Ossetia towards either independence or unification with Russia.
5       When discussing the South Ossetian narrative of the 'three genocides', the author adds the qualifier so-called and writes 
the phrase in italics, because the designation of the events of 1920, 1991-1992 and 2008 as acts of genocide is not used by any 
international human rights organization, nor by any UN member state (with the exception of the Russian Federation, which 
used this designation to justify its military operation in 2008). In addition, Georgian officials have never described these events 
as genocides. However, in South Ossetia (as well as in North Ossetia) this notion of genocide is perceived as an undisputable 
reality, so it is necessary to mention this important aspect of the South Ossetian narrative.
6       Kolstø (2006) claims that the main reasons why de facto states have not collapsed (though they have generally weak 
economies, weak state structures, and an absence of international recognition) are that they have managed to build up inter-
nal support from the local population through propaganda and identity-building; they channel a disproportionately large part 
of their meagre resources into military defence; enjoy the support of a strong patron; and, in most cases, have seceded from 
a state that is itself very weak (Kolstø, 2006, p. 723). Another factor contributing to the sustainability of de facto states is the 
complexity of the international community's approaches to them. As explained by Relitz (2019, p. 318), international actions to-
wards de facto states are framed in the stabilization dilemma. On the one hand, international actors support the stabilization 
of the international system through reintegration of separatist entities into their parent states, and on the other, they seek to 
stabilize the situation through international engagement. The dilemma is that policies directed towards one goal often have 
unintended and negative consequences regarding the achievement of the other.
71Independence or Unification with a Patron State? Not Such Dichotomous Ideas as One Would Think: 
Evidence from South Ossetia
become easier.7 During the 1990s and in the first few years of the new millennium, these territories 
were essentially closed to foreign researchers, but in the past fifteen years the practicalities of 
visiting these entities have become much simpler and a significant amount of studies have been 
based on empirical material collected on fieldtrips (Blakkisrud and Kolstø, 2012; Hoch and Kopeček, 
2020). These changes have meant that the topic of internal sovereignty and various internal aspects 
of development in de facto states came into the spotlight for many academics and policymakers.8
In 2001, Charles King labelled de facto states as 'informational black holes' (King, 2001, p. 550). 
Since that time, social science research in de facto states has documented many aspects of internal 
political, social, and economic dynamics and also their external relations with the outside world. 
However, despite growing interest in the topics connected with de facto statehood, there are 
still some aspects of this issue that remain relatively under-researched. One of these topics is the 
strategies used by de facto state representatives in an attempt to gain international recognition. 
While seeking recognition remains a highly important issue for governments in de facto states, 
very little research exists on why, how and when the leaders of these entities decide to change 
their recognition strategies (Caspersen, 2015, p. 393). Valuable contributions to the study of the 
recognition strategies in de facto states is represented by the research made by Caspersen (2008b) 
and Fabry (2012), who wrote comparative studies on the legitimisation of statehood in de facto 
states and on strategies that focus on gaining wider international recognition in Kosovo and three 
de facto states in the South Caucasus. Internal narratives supporting independence have also been 
recently examined in Somaliland (Hoch & Rudincová, 2015), in Abkhazia (Ó Beacháin, 2019), and in 
Iraqi Kurdistan (Palani et al., 2019). 
Whilst the prevailing view in the literature on de facto states is that these entities strive for 
internationally recognised independence, Kosienkowski (2017) argues that the Gagauz Republic’s 
leaders did not primarily pursue in the initial phase the goal of independence, and instead they 
strived for autonomy within the reformed Soviet Union. Only after it became apparent that this 
was not going to happen, did Gagauzia9 have no other choice than to declare independence. 
Another example of a fluctuating independence narrative comes from Transnistria, where in 
the 2006 referendum virtually all Transnistrians backed the idea of Transnistria joining Russia 
(Dembinska & Iglesias, 2013). However, before this referendum, the goal of the Transnistrian 
authorities oscillated between ideas supporting the international recognition of Transnistria’s full 
independence, creating a confederation with Moldova, and unification with Russia (Kosienkowski, 
2013). The issue of independence not being mutually exclusive to the idea of unification with the 
patron state also exists in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh10. Mikaelian (2017, p. 24-26) claims, that 
the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is deeply divided on the question of whether 
Nagorno-Karabakh should be an independent state or become part of Armenia. Other examples 
of a blurred narrative of independence versus unification with a patron state can be documented 
from the separatist entities, which emerged during the period of war in Yugoslavia at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Kostovicova (2004, p. 272) claims that although the Serbian leadership in Republika 
Srpska (originally called the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) declared independence, 
their initial aspirations were to unite with Serbia under the nationalist project of 'all Serbs in one 
state'. The same story also appeared in the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia, where the vision 
of all Serbs living in one state remained fundamental to the very end. Only after Milošević, for all 
practical purposes, abandoned this idea did the separatist leaders hold the hope at the very least 
7       Especially in the post-Soviet space, where most of the contemporary de facto states are located. The only exception in 
this matter is South Ossetia, which is still closed to foreign researchers.
8       For a recent overview of social science research on the topic of de facto statehood see e.g. Broers, Iskandaryan, and 
Minasyan, 2015; Yemelianova, 2015; Ker-Lindsay, 2017; Pegg, 2017; or Comai, 2018.
9       Gagauzia is a set of enclaves inhabited by ethnic Gagauz (Christians speaking a Turkic language), who were demanding 
from the beginning of the 1990s separation from Chisinau. After three years of de facto statehood, it was peacefully reintegrat-
ed into Moldova as an autonomous territorial unit.
10       The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is another example of a de facto state. The current conflict between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis began in the second half of the 1980s, but its roots are deep, reaching back much further in time. The new con-
stitution, which was approved in the 2017 referendum, stated that the political name of the entity was the Artsakh Republic. 
However, the author prefers to use in this text the political name Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the geographical name 
Nagorno-Karabakh because it is better known in the English-speaking world than Artsakh.
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– and as a first step towards full unification – they could create a common state with Republika 
Srpska in Bosnia (Kolstø & Paukovic, 2014, p. 323). The same authors further claimed that while 
the proclamation of independence normally signals a real aspiration for separate statehood, in the 
case of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, it could have also been a tactical ploy to escape the control 
of one state in an attempt to join another (Kolstø & Paukovic 2014, p. 310-311). In all these cases, it 
is evident that declared independence in a de facto state can overlap with the goal of unification 
with a patron state, especially when the patron is a neighbouring kin-state.
The South Ossetian narrative of the so-called 'three genocides'
In order to understand the content of the ongoing political discussion in South Ossetia regarding 
the impossibility of existing within the Georgian state, and the narratives of independence versus 
unification with Russia, it is important to undertake a brief review of the historical markers that 
saturate the current political agenda in South Ossetia. The first issue that is ever-present in this 
context is the narrative of the so-called 'three genocides'. 
The so-called first genocide refers to the military operations carried out during the existence of the 
Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). In this period, there were three large-scale uprisings by 
the South Ossetian population. These were initially motivated by dissatisfaction with the economic 
policies pursued by the central government in Tbilisi, which in the South Ossetians’ opinion 
unfairly prioritised the interests of large Georgian landowners over those of the Ossetian peasants. 
In 1918, the conflict was devoid of any nationalist connotations and clearly appeared to be a social 
conflict. Unlike the first rebellion of 1918, the second rebellion, that broke out in October 1919, was 
not spontaneous. It was planned and initiated with evident support from the Bolsheviks (Saparov, 
2010, p. 103-104). The combatants were two ethnically homogeneous groups – the South Ossetians 
(landless peasants who, under Russian influence, sought greater freedom and land rights) and the 
local Georgian aristocracy (to whom the land had traditionally belonged) – so the conflict quickly 
acquired an ethnic dimension. From 1918 onwards, a growing proportion of the South Ossetian 
population felt that their only source of support against the Georgians was Soviet Russia, which 
was keen to take control of South Ossetia. The socio-economic interests of the South Ossetian 
peasants thus predetermined their ethnic and political sympathies and antipathies to a substantial 
degree. Their dissatisfaction with the policies pursued by the Menshevik government in Tbilisi 
in areas with a majority Ossetian population strengthened their sympathies for the Bolsheviks. 
Given the traditionally warm relations between Ossetians and Russians11 and the Soviet strategic 
interest in regaining control over Georgia, the Ossetians were able to count on both military and 
political support from Moscow. During the 1919 uprising, and especially in the major uprising of 
1920, the South Ossetian rebels received clandestine yet substantial material support from the 
Red Army, and the Ossetian political elite overtly declared their desire to become part of Soviet 
Russia. However, in mid-1920, Moscow – reluctant to become involved in open military conflict 
on Georgian territory – distanced itself from its protégés in South Ossetia, and Georgian forces 
launched a major counter-offensive against the South Ossetian positions. This operation was 
accompanied by widespread ethnic cleansing; estimates range from 5,000 to 7,000 deaths, mainly 
of civilians, and more than 20,000 South Ossetians had to flee to Soviet Russia as the Georgian 
army advanced (Toal & O'loughlin, 2013; Dzidzoev, 2010).12
According to South Ossetian sources, the so-called second genocide occurred in the final years of 
the Soviet Union's existence. At the end of the 1980s, as a result of a power crisis in the USSR, a 
movement known as 'Matryoshka nationalism' emerged, sparking a process of ethno-national 
11       Like Russians, the majority of Ossetians (including South Ossetians) are Orthodox Christians. This is particularly signif-
icant in the context of the northern Caucasus, where the Ossetians – surrounded by Muslim neighbours – have traditionally 
been considered agents of Russian colonization in the region.
12       For more on the topic of ethnic clashes between Georgians and Ossetians in 1918–1921, see e.g. Saparov (2010) or Lang 
(1962). An Ossetian point of view can be found on the website devoted to the 'genocide of the Ossetian nation' at www.
osgenocide.ru
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mobilisation. Gamsakhurdia’s13 intransigent approach to ethnic minorities – which he viewed 
as a 'fifth column' of the Kremlin, and against which he frequently directed vehement verbal 
attacks – was shared by many Georgians. The proponents of the slogan 'Georgia for the Georgians' 
described ethnic minorities as guests on Georgian soil, and repeatedly threatened them (especially 
the Ossetians) with expulsion (Khutsishvili, 1994). This type of rhetoric, which came from leading 
political figures, exacerbated the already tense inter-ethnic relations in Georgia, where around 
a third of the population were members of ethnic minorities. This was preceded by the 'War of 
Laws', especially the language law and the series of laws dealing with the issue of autonomous 
status.14 In addition to the conflict at the legislative level, active discussion was ongoing in public 
circles and the media about the events that were unfolding in South Ossetia. Confrontation at the 
political level escalated into violence following a number of violent acts carried out by members of 
Georgian paramilitary forces, including the blockade of Tskhinvali. According to Ossetian sources, 
the blockade lasted three months (Genotsid Osetin, 2007). The conflict flared up again in the spring 
of 1991, as Georgians expelled Ossetians from their homes and vice versa. These clashes left dozens 
of people dead or injured. From mid-1991, Tskhinvali was subjected to artillery bombardment from 
the nearby hills, and in the autumn the city was encircled by Georgian units. This was despite 
the presence of around 500 troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry, who had been posted in South 
Ossetia since April 1991 (König, 2004). The conflict between the Georgians and the Ossetians lasted 
a year and a half. The war left a thousand people dead and a hundred missing; between 40,000 and 
100,000 Ossetian refugees fled Georgia (including South Ossetia) to Russia,15 and 23,000 Georgian 
refugees moved to other regions of the country (International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 4-5). According 
to Ossetian sources, between 1989 and 1992 the region sustained a loss of 516.3 billion Russian 
roubles. About 1,000 people were killed (i.e. 1% of the total population of South Ossetia) and 3,500 
were wounded; 120 people remained missing, and up to 20,000 ethnic Ossetians from South Ossetia 
were forced to flee to North Ossetia. Out of 365 villages, 117 were partly or completely burned and 
looted as a result of this conflict (Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2006).
The so-called third genocide is related to the five-day war between Georgia and Russia in 2008. 
Although cases of less intense shelling by both sides in the area had also been reported in previous 
years, during the summer of 2008 Georgian-South Ossetian relations deteriorated further. In July 
2008, the Ossetian chief of police was killed, and armed clashes became more frequent. On the 
night of 8 August, these clashes escalated into heavy fighting. After five days, the war ended 
with a six-point plan presented by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose country held the 
presidency of the EU at the time. Estimates of the numbers of dead and injured have varied, in part 
because Russia initially granted the media and most NGOs only limited access to South Ossetia. 
Early claims by Russian and Ossetian sources have mentioned that 1,400–2,000 people were killed 
as a result of military operations; after the war, their estimates of casualties in South Ossetia were 
significantly reduced.16 On 15 September 2008, the Georgian government reported that 372 citizens 
had died, of which 168 were military servicemen, 188 civilians, and 16 police officers (Nichol, 2009, 
p. 15). Approximately 15,000 refugees headed to Russia, and another 20,000 fled into the interior of 
Georgia (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 3).
The perceived narrative of the so-called 'three genocides' dominates current political discourse in 
South Ossetia, and it is perpetually reiterated in educational institutions as well as in the state 
13       Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a dissident, and at the end of the 1980s he became the leader of the Georgian national move-
ment. Later he became the first democratically elected Georgian President.
14       For a more detailed legal analysis of the issue of separatism in South Ossetia, see e.g. Walter, von Ungern-Sternberg, 
and Abushov, 2014.
15       The lower figure is based on data from UNHCR (estimations as of 1998), the 100,000 figure is used by North Ossetian 
officials (International Crisis Group 2004, 4-5). The UN figures for 2001 estimate the total number of displaced persons as a 
result of the conflict at 60,000 (cited in Saparov, 2010, p. 100).
16       Compare early data from August and September 2008 (e.g. Interfax.ru, 2008; or Sputnik, 2008) with the December 2008 
statement by an official in the Russian Prosecutor’s Office claiming that 162 civilians had been killed in South Ossetia, and a 
February 2009 statement by the Russian Deputy Defence Minister claiming that 64 military personnel had been killed and 283 
wounded in the region during the conflict (Nichol, 2009, p. 15).
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media.17 The political reflection of this narrative is the 'Declaration of the Genocide of 1920 in South 
Ossetia', which was adopted by the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet on 20 September 1990.18 In April 
2006, the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia adopted the 'Declaration on the Genocide of 
the South Ossetian people in 1989-1992' (Regnum.ru, 2006). Similarly, the 2008 war is considered by 
the South Ossetian state authorities to have been an act of genocide against the people of South 
Ossetia (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Ossetia, 2013). The experience of 
several military campaigns, political and economic instability, social deprivation, depopulation 
and other post-conflict symptoms has led to a reluctance among the Ossetian population to live 
in the same state with Georgians, as well as to the aspiration either to achieve independence or 
to join the Russian Federation. 
Security as an argument for unification with Russia
The next three sections are entitled Security as an argument for unification with Russia, The idea of 
a divided nation as a basis for unification within Russia, and limited resources and the quest for the 
centralisation of power as an argument in favour of unification with Russia. As is apparent from their 
titles, they are all focused on the review of current political preferences in South Ossetia regarding 
accession to the Russian Federation. The aim of these three sections is identifying the factors that 
underlie the current prevailing South Ossetian discourse supporting the idea of unification with 
the Russian Federation.
The narrative of the so-called 'three genocides' – constantly reinforced by political and military 
confrontations during the past 25 years – has generated constant fear and uncertainty about the 
future in South Ossetian society. These concerns and fears have resulted in a strong interconnection 
between the narrative of the so-called 'three genocides' and the current situation, in which Russia 
is the main guarantor of South Ossetian security.
The first President of South Ossetia, Lyudvig Chibirov, considered South Ossetian independence 
to be a matter of prestige, but he underlined the necessity to unite with Russia, which he saw 
as a guarantee protecting the Ossetian people from further genocides: “I believe that joining the 
Russian Federation provides a reliable political future for the next generations. This will give us a firm 
guarantee to avoid all kinds of genocides that we have suffered since the 18th century, including in the 
21st century” (Osinform.ru, 2015).
The second South Ossetian President, Eduard Kokoity, argued in 2006 that Georgia's genocidal 
policies had forced South Ossetia to take the path of self-determination. “The entire history of 
our relations says that South Ossetia's presence in the same state as Georgia threatens our people 
with genocide” (Russia & CIS General Newswire, 2006). Later Kokoity added that South Ossetia’s 
independence was only the first step, and that the next step would involve the unification of the 
two Ossetias (Utro.ru, 2006). It should be mentioned that during his presidency, Eduard Kokoity 
twice appealed to various branches of the Russian authorities to accept South Ossetia as a part 
of the Russian Federation (Markedonov, 2013). On the first occasion, in 2004, he directed this 
appeal to both chambers of the Russian State Duma, and on the second occasion he appealed to 
the Constitutional Court of Russia. In both cases, the issue of security played a dominant role in 
his argument, but these appeals did not bring about any change in the situation (Lenta.ru, 2006).
In 2012, Kokoity’s successor as President, Leonid Tibilov, connected the narrative of the so-
called 'three genocides' with South Ossetia’s current Russian-oriented security and foreign policy: 
'New people in the Georgian government should understand and accept our fundamental and 
unchanging attitude to what happened between Georgia and South Ossetia. Georgia has to 
17       For further details about how widespread this narrative is in the South Ossetian media, see the website of the State 
Committee of Information and Press of the Republic of South Ossetia – Res (RES, Gosudarstvennoye informatsionnoye agent-
stvo Respubliky Yuzhnaya Osetiya).
18       Its full text can be found on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Ossetia: http://
www.mfa-rso.su/en/node/362
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recognise the genocide of the Ossetian people' (RES, 2012). Three years later, Tibilov cited the issue 
of security as one of the main reasons for conducting a referendum on accession to Russia: “Today 
the political reality is that we should make our historical choice. We should unite with our Russian 
brothers and ensure our security for many centuries and the prosperity of our Republic and our people” 
(Ekho Kavkaza, 2015a).
Likewise, the current President – Anatoly Bibilov, one of the most vocal supporters of a referendum 
on unification with Russia – has appealed to the Georgian authorities to apologise for the Ossetian 
genocide, calling the former Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili a war criminal who will have to 
answer many questions in front of the tribunal for the genocide of the Ossetian people (RES, 2018).
The issue of security is also predominant in statements issued by parliamentary political parties. 
The United Ossetia Party states: “Existence within Russia ensures firm security for South Ossetia” (RES, 
2014). The Nykhas Party states: “Unification with Russia is a guarantee of our security for centuries. 
It is a guarantee of our development despite the existence of various aggressors” (Regnum.ru, 2015). 
The People's Party of South Ossetia states: “Only within Russia can we ensure the security of South 
Ossetia” (Regnum.ru, 2015). All these statements demonstrate that security is at the heart of one 
of the main arguments dominating proclamations by South Ossetian politicians on the idea of 
unification with Russia. 
The idea of a divided nation as a basis for unification within Russia
Another important argument used by South Ossetian politicians in favour of accession to Russia is 
associated with the idea of a divided nation. Efforts to achieve the unification of South and North 
Ossetia within the boundaries of the Russian Federation – with the aim of unifying a divided nation 
– occupy a central place in the Ossetian national narrative. The debate on unification originated 
soon after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Ossetia's pro-unification camp has been presented as a 
united emancipation movement of the Ossetian peasantry against Georgian feudalism; unification 
is also considered the basis for the establishment of a single nation state. During the First People’s 
Congress of the South and North Ossetian People, the following idea was expressed: “This historical 
mission – to unite Ossetia and establish a united national organism, creating a common national basis 
for the progressive development of the Ossetian people – arose in front of us in all its greatness” (Bliev, 
2006, p. 158).
The idea of South and North Ossetia's unification experienced a revival at the end of the 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s, during the ascendancy of the Ossetian national movement. After the 
August War of 2008, debate on this subject gained a new stimulus. Inal Sanakoev, a North Ossetian 
specialist in humanitarian and social research, gave an interview with Bimbolat Albegov in which 
he made the following statement: “If during the Soviet era the division of Ossetia was only conditional 
in nature, because the territories of North and South Ossetia were divided by administrative boundaries, 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union the issue of South Ossetia's independence gained an international 
juridical dimension. After the August War of 2008, this problem returned to the forefront of discussion 
in Ossetian society, and discourse about unification has become more common. Representatives of both 
South and North Ossetia have participated in this discourse” (Albegov, 2012). 
During discussions about unification, South Ossetian politicians place particular emphasis on the 
notion of historical justice. Dimitri Tassoev, the former Deputy Speaker of the South Ossetian 
Parliament, stated: “In the 18th century, the Ossetian lands became part of the Russian Empire in a 
united form, not divided. We want to restore historical justice. The Ossetian people will unite” (Albegov, 
2012). Arguments of this kind were also made by Eduard Kokoity, the former de facto President 
of South Ossetia, when he appealed to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with 
a request to accept South Ossetia as a federative entity of the Russian Federation (Markedonov, 
2013).
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It is clear that local politicians and opinion makers actively exploit the idea of the divided nation as 
a rationale for the idea of South Ossetia’s unification with Russia. From the 1990s to the present-
day, opinions expressed on this topic have remained quite homogenous – not only on the part of 
the government, but also among opposition groups. This can again be documented in statements 
made by South Ossetian Presidents. Lyudvig Chibirov, the first de facto President of South Ossetia, 
said: “I think first of all we will accede to the Russian Federation as an entity within the federation, and 
only after this will it be technically possible to accomplish our idea: to fulfil the dream of all Ossetian 
people, North and South Ossetia will unite as a single entity. It would be nonsense to have one people 
living in two separate autonomous republics within one state” (Noguasamonga.ru, 1996; Cornell, 
2001, p. 195).
Similar statements have also been made by Eduard Kokoity, Chibirov’s successor as President: 
“Independence is only the first stage in our struggle. We are a small nation. In order to retain our 
language, culture and identity, we should unite our efforts. Today, North and South Ossetia are closer to 
each other than ever before in the past” (Utro.ru, 2006).
For Leonid Tibilov, who was President before the current President of South Ossetia, the unification 
of the two Ossetias became a political mission: “If it occurs during my presidency, I will consider that 
I have fulfilled the mission assigned to the President at the present stage” (Ria Novosti, 2013).
Anatoly Bibilov, the incumbent President of South Ossetia, shares the same opinion. Bibilov founded 
the Unity Party, whose ideological aim is to promote the idea of the unification of both Ossetias: 
“We [South and North Ossetians] are one people. The official border, with all its formal procedures, 
divides us into two Ossetias. We should transform the unification into a project that is slowly but surely 
implemented. We should carry out the unification of legislation, equalise the living standards and social 
protection of citizens, develop infrastructure. This should be a serious plan that will be implemented at 
the level of two states” (Albegov, 2012).
The majority of the Ossetian population backs the unification of the two Ossetias. Even those 
experts who see this goal as an impossible aspiration nevertheless acknowledge that the opinion 
of South Ossetia's population is consolidated in this regard. For example, despite the fact that 
Mira Tskhovrebova, the former Deputy Speaker of South Ossetia's Parliament, is sceptical about 
the possibility of unification, she believes that “there is no Ossetian who opposes the idea of the 
unification of the two Ossetias” – because, according to her, “it is the age-old dream of the Ossetian 
people – to live in a united Ossetia” (Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2013). During the debate about the public 
consensus on the unification of the two Ossetias, various experts and politicians cite the results 
of public opinion surveys. According to data from the most recent Ossetian public opinion survey 
on this topic, carried out in 2011, 92.5% of the population of South Ossetia supports unification 
with North Ossetia (Regnum.ru, 2011a); in this respect the mood of the South Ossetian public 
has hardly shifted at all in recent years. South Ossetian policy analyst Kosta Dzugaev believes 
that around 90% of South Ossetians continue to back unification with North Ossetia (Albegov, 
2012). Similar attitudes are documented in a public opinion survey conducted by John O’Loughlin, 
Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal, in which over 80% of South Ossetians expressed the desire for 
union with the Russian Federation (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, & Toal, 2014).
Limited resources and the quest for the centralisation of power as an argument 
in favour of unification with Russia
According to comparative studies of de facto states in the post-Soviet space, South Ossetia is the 
least developed region in terms of civil society, the economy and state-building efforts (Kolstø 
& Blakkisrud, 2008; Spanke, 2015). Its substantial dependency on the Russian Federation and its 
lack of human and natural resources are presented as the strongest arguments for its unification 
with Russia. A leading proponent of unification with Russia, Anatoly Bibilov, considers unification 
to be an essential precondition for economic development. From his point of view, the lack of 
freedom of movement between South Ossetia and North Ossetia seriously affects economic 
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development (Vestnik Kavkaza, 2014). Indeed, the dependency of South Ossetia on the Russian 
Federation is overwhelming. According to independent experts, in economic terms South Ossetia 
is more dependent on Russia (and receives more funding from Russia in proportion to its budget) 
than any other North Caucasian republic (Pakhomienko, 2015). According to data published by 
Russian news agency TASS, In the period 2008–2014, Russia allocated more than 43 billion roubles 
to promote social and economic development in South Ossetia, 9.1 billion roubles between 2015 
and 2017, and another 4.3 billion roubles are planned from the Russian budget for the years 2018–
2019 (TASS.ru, 2018). Direct budget support from Russia every year, covers between 86 and 99% of 
the South Ossetian budget (International Crisis Group, 2010; TASS.ru, 2018).19  
Another aspect of Russian economic aid is the payment of pensions in South Ossetia, the salaries 
of civil servants, and the state security forces. Long before their recognition of South Ossetia’s 
independence in 2008, Russia provided passports for inhabitants of South Ossetia and most 
importantly, it provided security guarantees that came to be fully felt in August 2008, when Russia 
did not hesitate to demonstrate its support for separatists by sending its own army into the conflict 
with Georgia. Despite these events, however, it would not be accurate to claim that Russia provided 
consistent support for the separatists. Its policy underwent major shifts over the course of time.20 
Nevertheless, it can be claimed that without Russian material and moral support, the de facto 
state in South Ossetia would have hardly been able to come into existence. Political, diplomatic, 
military, and economic assistance from Russia are thus very closely linked and constitute a major 
guarantee for South Ossetia’s security and the opportunity to keep the economy and social system 
at an acceptable level. In return for the necessary economic and political support from Russia, 
politicians are loyal to its interests, which reduces the real decision-making capacity of local 
politicians and their desire to look at all the options for a common solution to the conflict with 
Georgia. For Russia, there is one more benefit from the unresolved conflict. South Ossetia is a 
useful coercive policy tool against Georgia.21 This mutually advantageous interconnection creates 
a classic patron-client relationship. Russia’s multi-layered policy towards South Ossetia, is without 
any doubt, absolutely essential for maintaining at least a limited form of de facto independent 
existence (Hoch, Souleimanov & Baranec, 2014, p. 66-68).
An important part of the debate on potential independent statehood or unification with Russia, 
is the size of the local population. The Statistics Department of South Ossetia released the final 
results of a 2016 census, which claims that the current population of South Ossetia is 53,000 
people and that the majority of the population (90%) are ethnic Ossetians and only 7% of the 
population are ethnic Georgians (Georgia Today, 2016). However, according to estimates by the 
International Crisis Group and the European Council on Foreign Relations, the actual population 
of South Ossetia does not exceed 30,000 (International Crisis Group, 2010; Kachmazova, 2016). 
Many politicians in South Ossetia consider the size of the population in the de facto republic to be 
too small to build an independent, self-sufficient nation state. According to local experts, massive 
migration by the economically active population, especially young people, will exacerbate the lack 
of human capital even in the mid-term perspective. “If out of ten South Ossetians, seven young people 
leave South Ossetia and aim to stay in North Ossetia, who will live in an independent South Ossetia?” 
(Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2014b). Some experts from South Ossetia consider the existence of South Ossetia 
as an independent state to be unfeasible. For example, the political scientist Kosta Dzugaev holds 
the following opinion: “Only 10% of the total population of Ossetia live in South Ossetia. This figure 
is insufficient for building an independent state even when receiving Russian support. The logic of the 
national movement forces us to address the issue of unification” (Albegov, 2012).
Another internal problem articulated in the South Ossetian public space involves the inefficiency 
of the local authorities, the clan-type governance and a high level of corruption. Because the de 
facto authorities in Tskhinvali are not able to solve these problems, the local population sees 
joining Russia as the only solution. In the opinion of the Russian expert Sergey Markedonov: 
19       For further details about the performance of the South Ossetian economy, its internal structure and cross border trade 
see e.g. Baarová, 2019, p. 162-168; Prelz Oltramonti 2013, p. 237-253.
20       For more on the topic of relations between Russia and South Ossetia see e.g. Ambrosio and Lange, 2016 or German, 2016.
21       For more on this issue see e.g. Souleimanov, Abrahamyan, and Aliyev, 2018.
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“Ordinary citizens of South Ossetia are not satisfied with the situation in the republic. They think that 
with the participation of the Russian Federation in the processes of South Ossetia’s governance (without 
middlemen and trusted persons) the situation will improve” (Markedonov, 2014). 
To sum it up, in South Ossetia, unification with the Russian Federation is thus generally considered 
to be an instrument for unifying a divided nation, for boosting economic development, enhancing 
the security situation in the region, halting the trend of massive outward migration from South 
Ossetia, as well as a way of ensuring better governance.
Arguments of those against unification 
After three sections devoted to identifying and explaining the preferences in South Ossetia regarding 
unification with the Russian Federation, this section aims to introduce the arguments of those 
opposed to this political unification. First, it needs to be said that it is not a simple task to identify 
the genuine opponents to the idea of South Ossetia’s unification with the Russian Federation. This 
is due to that fact that politicians’ statements in this regard are inconsistent (and in some cases 
self-contradictory). Nevertheless, such opinions do exist in South Ossetia. Addressing the desire 
of local elites to undermine the idea of unification with Russia, some politicians claim that, if the 
unification process were to begin, the interests of local bureaucrats would be endangered. Alan 
Jussoev, the deputy director of the internal affairs department in the South Ossetian presidential 
administration, has stated: “I do not think that our elites say a consistent ‘yes’ to the idea of joining 
Russia. High-ranking officials understand that if our institutions are reorganised to converge with 
Russian structures, 80 per cent of them will lose their jobs” (Meduza.io, 2015). A similar idea was 
confirmed by Tengiz Doguzov, editor-in-chief of the journal Vestnik Osetii: “It must be said that there 
are forces in South Ossetia that oppose the idea of unification. Many state officials are simply afraid of 
losing their well-paid posts and privileges in the case of joining Russia” (Sviridova, 2015).
In addition, joining the Russian Federation does not necessarily bring any additional guarantees 
of security. Indeed, viewed from a certain perspective, it could even damage the interests of the 
South Ossetian people in the long term – if more liberal-minded people were to take power in 
Moscow. The Ossetian journalist Alan Parastaev explains this point of view, which also resonates 
in the South Ossetian public space: “If Putin is replaced, the new leader may decide to give us back to 
Georgia. If we were part of Russia, it would be much easier for them to give us back to Georgia than in 
the current situation” (Meduza.io, 2015).
One of the visible opponents of unification is Viliam Dzagoev, the former South Ossetian Minister 
of Economic Development. In his opinion, South Ossetia may (in economic terms) lose more than 
it gains if it joins Russia. “Independence is an advantage for our monetary policy, in which all tax rates 
are lower: income tax is 12%, and VAT is 10%. In addition, due to the fact that Russia does not apply 
export duties on South Ossetia, gasoline and other products are cheaper here than in North Ossetia. 
Salaries are therefore the same as in North Ossetia, while taxes and prices are lower. Is it not better to 
remain independent?” (Meduza.io, 2015).
However, the most common argument raised by the opponents of unification with the Russian 
Federation is connected to Russia’s inability to take this step, given the geopolitical reality that 
has emerged since the annexation of Crimea. According to this view, unification with the Russian 
Federation is unrealistic as it could provoke further sanctions against Russia and a further 
deterioration of Moscow’s relations with the West. According to Mira Tskhovrebova, the former 
Deputy Speaker of the South Ossetian Parliament, there is no point in holding another referendum, 
as Russia currently implicitly rejects the idea of unification. “Russia is not ready to incorporate us 
either as an independent republic or as a part of North Ossetia. Vladimir Putin and Dimitri Medvedev 
have expressed their views on this matter several times. Similar opinions have also been expressed at 
various conferences and roundtables focusing on South Ossetia and its [geopolitical] location in the 
South Caucasus” (Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2013). Viacheslav Gobozov, the leader of the non-parliamentary 
Fatherland Socialist Party, expressed a similar opinion: “It makes no sense to hold a referendum in 
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the absence of consent from Russia. Moscow has repeatedly made it clear that at this stage, it is rather 
comfortable with the current status of South Ossetia as an independent state” (Meduza.io, 2015). 
Alexei Chesnakov, a former deputy head of the Russian Presidential Administration's Internal 
Policy Directorate, and a political analyst close to the Kremlin, also believes that the agreement on 
alliance and integration signed in March 2015 is enough: “Moscow is satisfied with the current pace 
of integration processes. There is no need to give them new incentives” (Sinelschikova, 2015).
One explanation of Russia’s unwillingness to cooperate in the unification process comes from 
Dimitri Medoev, the South Ossetian Foreign Minister. In his view, unification would give additional 
impetus to the criticism levelled against South Ossetia and Russia by Georgia and its allies in the 
West: “However, the accusations against Russia regarding the so-called ‘occupation’ still persist. Why 
should we give another reason and additional arguments to the opponents of Russia?” (Regnum.ru, 
2011b). Another explanation is based on the additional economic costs that Russia would incur 
in the event of unification. From this point of view, it would be rather difficult for Russia to 
implement the unification process adequately. Alan Jussoev explained this obstacle: “We have no 
air connections or rail traffic with Russia. Solutions for transport-related issues are very expensive, and 
you need to develop many industries locally. I don’t think Russia is ready for that” (Meduza.io, 2015).
There is one more important barrier to unifying South Ossetia with its northern neighbour, the 
rather hesitant approach of North Ossetia. North Ossetians and South Ossetians, though in many 
respects close to each other, report many social, cultural and political differences.22 Another 
factor that creates tension between the Ossetian population is the number of refugees who fled 
to North Ossetia as a result of violence, and later on as migrants connected with the vulnerable 
South Ossetian economy. The North Ossetian police frequently blame South Ossetians for illegal 
arms trading, racketeering, robberies and other crimes. All of these issues have reportedly soured 
relations between the two territories (Minority Rights Group International: Ossetians, 2019). These 
differences can also be seen in the results of a public opinion survey conducted in North and South 
Ossetia in autumn 2011. While more than 90% of the population in South Ossetia expressed their 
support for the idea of unification with its northern neighbour, only about half of the population 
in North Ossetia expressed support for unification (Baarová, 2019).
The calls for the unification of the two regions thus come mainly from South Ossetia. The position 
adopted by the North Ossetian elites to this issue could be described as a strategic silence rather 
than enthusiastic support for the idea. Though the idea of unification of both Ossetias has been 
previously articulated by the President of North Ossetia, Taimuraz Mamsurov, his successors to 
the post of head of North Ossetia, Tamerlan Aguzarov and Viatcheslav Bitarov, did not openly 
express their willingness to unify with South Ossetia. They both took part in many celebrations 
marking important anniversaries in South Ossetia and called for a deep and friendly cooperation 
in cultural, economic and social issues, but mostly on a platform of 'one nation – two countries'. 
An illustration of this fact may be a speech by President Aguzarov at the celebration of the 25th 
anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic of South Ossetia, where he wished the people 
and the leadership of South Ossetia success, good luck and well-being, and said: “I have always 
said: We are two republics, but we are one people” (Republic of North Ossetia-Alania official portal, 
2015a). Equally hesitant and cautious in this sense are the speeches of the current head of North 
22       One of them is language. Most academic texts refer to the same Indo-European language spoken by Ossetians inhabiting 
both North and South Ossetia. The reality is a bit more complicated. Of the two Ossetian dialects, Digor is spoken in the west 
of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and in neighbouring Kabardino-Balkaria, and Iron in the east of North Ossetia and in 
South Ossetia. The two Ossetian dialects are sufficiently different as to not be mutually comprehensible. Most speakers of Dig-
or can understand Iron, but not vice versa. There are, for example, some 2,500 words in Digor that do not exist in Iron and the 
phonetic, morphological, and lexical differences between them appear to be greater than between Chechen and Ingush (Fuller, 
2015). There also exist many other differences between North and South Ossetia, which are creating obstacles for political 
integration. For example, South Ossetians (as Russian citizens) are well integrated into the economy of North Ossetia. Half of 
the population of the Republic of South Ossetia has already acquired private property on the territory of North Ossetia, which 
cannot be said vice versa. The population of South Ossetia can vote and be elected in North Ossetian elections. But because 
of a controversial residency Law, which dictates permanent residence in the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia for the 
last 10 years before elections, North Ossetians, cannot participate in political life in South Ossetia. In this sense, Journalist 
Anna Chochieva is asking a rhetorical question: 'Is it possible to propose the unification of the people, economy and culture, 
depriving the representatives of this people (most of whom live in North Ossetia), the opportunity to fully participate in the 
political and economic life of South Ossetia?' (Chochieva, 2018).
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Ossetia. Two months before signing the alliance and integration treaty between South Ossetia and 
the Russian Federation, he commented on the draft of the treaty in the following way: “This treaty 
is a historical chance for us to make a very big step towards the integration of the economy and social 
sphere of South Ossetia into the concerns of Russia” (Republic of North Ossetia-Alania official portal, 
2015b). Again, there was no word of support for the political unification of the two regions, and 
the same applies to his subsequent public speeches. It is therefore clear that while the desire to 
unite with North Ossetia currently prevails in South Ossetia as one of the most important political 
goals, in Moscow and Vladikavkaz these political preferences are far from being taken as seriously.
The question of a referendum and its internal political implications
Political leaders in South Ossetia have mentioned on many occasions that the whole question of 
unification with the Russian Federation or the preservation of de facto independent statehood 
should be decided in another referendum on the subject. The last section of this article is thus 
devoted to the preparation for this announced referendum, and to the analysis of the political 
implications connected with this scenario. In this context, an important question arises: who 
influences whom? Are the masses being led and manipulated by their elites or vice versa? In 
the case of South Ossetia, it is a two-way process. On the one hand, voters of course influence 
the behaviour of politicians, who naturally try to follow the majority opinion in South Ossetian 
society. On the other hand, in a very authoritarian regime, as South Ossetia without any doubt is,23 
politicians shape public opinion and, above all, they are shaped by the attitude of Russia, which 
is by far the most important player in this regard. Therefore, the answer to this question is not 
simple, but rather a puzzle of different interlocking pieces. The aim of the following pages is to 
present these parts of the puzzle.
The idea of unification is a political issue around which most of the voters coalesce, so the 
behaviour of political parties is not surprising in this respect. For example, the political platform 
of the Unity Party (founded in 2003, which for a decade was South Ossetia’s largest political party, 
holding a majority in the Parliament) was completely built on the idea of the unification of the 
two Ossetias. Before the parliamentary elections in 2014, its leader Anatoly Bibilov transformed 
the party into a new republican political party, United Ossetia. In the most recent parliamentary 
elections, this party obtained 20 seats out of 34. According to a statement by Bibilov, who became 
the President of South Ossetia after the 2017 presidential elections, the main objective of United 
Ossetia is to bring South Ossetia back within the boundaries of Russia (Vestnik Kavkaza, 2014). The 
other three political parties represented in the Parliament (Unity of the People, the People's Party 
of South Ossetia and Nykhas) also support a referendum and the idea of unification with Russia 
(Ekho Kavkaza, 2015b).
Before 2015, South Ossetia’s President, Leonid Tibilov, made very cautious statements about 
unification with Russia. The main arguments of Tibilov and his supporters were based on the 
assumption that South Ossetia’s accession to Russia could provoke severe criticism and additional 
sanctions from the West. For example, in a statement from 15 January 2015, he accused the 
Unity Party of political manipulation by exploiting the idea of unification. He emphasised two 
important arguments. First, as a result of a Russian presidential decree issued on 26 August 2008, 
Russia in fact supported and recognised the will of the South Ossetian people as expressed in the 
referendums of 1992 and 2006 – both of which backed independence. The relations between the 
two countries were thus based on this fact. Second, Tibilov argued that the idea of a referendum 
affected (whether directly or indirectly) the interests of the Russian Federation, which was a 
strategic partner of South Ossetia (Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2014a). In his subsequent statements, Tibilov 
supported the idea of unification but underlined the fact that this issue was not yet on the agenda: 
“I think the idea of unification with Russia genuinely exists in our society; it is not a secret. We will try 
to implement this idea, but we are not yet bringing it to the table because we have to take into account 
many things” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2015). 
23       See e.g.Freedom in the World 2019 report for South Ossetia issued by Freedom House. Retrieved from https://freedom-
house.org/country/south-ossetia/freedom-world/2019
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However, during a meeting with Vladislav Surkov24 on 19 October 2015, Tibilov stated that he 
was planning to conduct a referendum on the issue of unification with Russia (RES, 2015). This 
statement significantly changed the configuration of the internal political struggle in South 
Ossetia. Until that moment, the Speaker of the Parliament had been accused of 'privatising' the 
idea of unification; however, President Tibilov’s new initiative – and the fact that the initiative 
received support from the majority of political parties – shifted the ground on which political 
disputes took place. Tibilov’s initiative was based on the following legal arguments: “In the legal 
sense, the results of the referendum held in 2006 annulled the results of the 1992 referendum [during 
which the population of South Ossetia had supported accession to Russia]. Therefore, it is necessary 
to hold a new referendum on accession to the Russian Federation” (Utro.ru, 2015). On the other 
hand, some experts considered Tibilov’s move to be politically motivated and part of his electoral 
campaign – because by presenting this issue, he tried to seize the initiative from his main political 
opponent, Anatoly Bibilov: “In this situation, Leonid Tibilov is trying to gain political capital before the 
presidential elections. It is an attempt to remove the initiative from his strong political rival, for whom 
this subject is a strategic issue” (Ekho Kavkaza, 2015b).
Since that time, the domestic political scene in South Ossetia has been dominated by the debate over 
whether, when, and how the region should eventually become part of Russia. From the autumn of 
2015 to April 2017, the main area of dispute between Tibilov and Bibilov has concerned the approach 
to the referendum. As Kochieva (2016) explains: “While Bibilov has long called for full integration 
with Russia through a merger with North Ossetia, Tibilov would like to preserve some semblance of 
independence – and presumably control over financial flows – by having South Ossetia incorporated into 
Russia as a separate federal entity rather than as part of a Greater Ossetia” (Kochieva, 2016). 
In late December 2015, Tibilov announced that a referendum should take place long before the 
2017 presidential elections, and should also contain a question on whether or not to rename the 
region 'Republic of South Ossetia–State of Alania'. Bibilov rejected this plan and reiterated his 
proposal to conduct the referendum on the sole question of whether or not South Ossetia should 
become part of Russia. The two rivals finally reached agreement in May 2016. In order to preserve 
domestic political stability, they agreed that the referendum should take place only after the 2017 
presidential election. However, by scheduling the referendum on the name change for 9 April 2017 
(at the same time as the presidential elections), Tibilov violated this agreement (Fuller, 2017). 
Among the other potential presidential candidates, the only one who wanted to uphold South 
Ossetia’s nominally independent status was the former President Eduard Kokoity. Before the 
election, in an interview to Interfax, he stated: “The President of South Ossetia should be a person 
who will strengthen the country's independence and expand the strategic partnership with Russia” 
(Interfax.ru, 2016). Kokoity failed to meet the requirement that presidential candidates must have 
spent at least nine months of each of the ten years prior to an election living in South Ossetia. He 
was refused registration as a presidential candidate by the Central Electoral Commission due to 
the fact that he has lived in Russia since he left office in late 2011. Since the outset, Moscow has 
made it very clear that it will not support Kokoity (Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2016; Silayev, 2016). A possible 
reason for the Russian reluctance to support the former President of South Ossetia's candidacy, 
was his criticism of the deployment of Russian border guards in South Ossetia in the autumn 
of 2016. The second reason for him being unpopular in Moscow is the alleged embezzlement of 
millions of roubles Moscow made available for the reconstruction of homes and infrastructure 
destroyed during the August 2008 war. An additional fact that did not help him in getting Russian 
support, was the good personal ties of his opposing candidates Tibilov and Bibilov with Surkov. 
They have always both been very loyal to Moscow and received the imaginary green light from 
Surkov during his February visit to Tskhinvali. Therefore, there was no need for Moscow to support 
Kokoity, a man with a controversial reputation.
Presidential elections were held on 9 April 2017, along with a referendum on renaming South 
Ossetia as 'Republic of South Ossetia–State of Alania'. Bibilov received almost 55% of the votes, 
24       At that time Vladislav Surkov was the Russian President’s aide for relations with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Don-
bass region.
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so he became the new President of South Ossetia in the first round of the ballot. Over 79% of 
voters also supported the name change. The official name 'Republic of South Ossetia–State of 
Alania' is a clear analogy with North Ossetia-Alania, and President Bibilov continued in his goal of 
unification with Russia. Soon after the election he made a statement: “I am a staunch supporter 
of South Ossetia’s entry into the Russian Federation … We are Russian citizens, our economy is tied 
to Russia, salaries and programmes are financed from the Russian budget … This is a historical 
injustice, when one nation is divided, and we must correct this injustice” (Georgia Today, 2017). In 
an interview with the BBC's Russian service, Bibilov added: “Everyone in South Ossetia thinks that 
the Republic of South Ossetia is an independent state. However, if we think deeply, we see the division of 
ethnicity … The likelihood that South Ossetia will join Russia is one hundred per cent” (News.am, 2017). 
During the period from 2015 to 2017, the referendum on joining Russia was the most important 
topic in South Ossetian domestic politics. However, this issue has remained somewhat overlooked 
since the most recent presidential elections. One explanation for this retreat from the centre of 
attention might be connected to Russia’s unpreparedness or unwillingness to take a further step 
towards incorporating South Ossetia, at least at the present time. During his visit to Moscow, 
President Bibilov stated: “The union is possible only within Russia, by the reunification of North and 
South Ossetia … We all clearly understand it, but understanding is one thing, the political process is 
another” (News.am, 2017).
Conclusion
The majority of the South Ossetian population, as well as the South Ossetian political elite, 
currently back the idea of unification with Russia. The idea of being part of Georgia does not 
resonate in South Ossetian society at this stage. Designating Georgian-Ossetian relations under the 
history of the so-called 'three genocides' has become part of the South Ossetian national narrative. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, members of the pro-Russian government in Tskhinvali 
have been presenting the history of Ossetian-Georgian relations as evidence of perceived malice 
and brutality on the part of the Georgians, which has resulted in a strong unwillingness to co-exist 
within a single state. The main argument that dominates the proclamations of South Ossetian 
politicians regarding the idea of unification with Russia is associated with the issue of security. The 
unification of South Ossetia with North Ossetia is understood as a significant guarantee that in the 
future, Russia will not refuse to protect South Ossetia – even if there is a radical change in Russia’s 
internal political situation in favour of Georgia. The second argument in favour of accession to 
Russia – an argument which frequently appears in the statements of the South Ossetian political 
elite – is the idea that only one Ossetia exists, and that the present division is a result of actions 
carried out by various external forces. The third reason for unification with Russia is the opinion 
that only 10% of the total Ossetian population lives in South Ossetia, which makes it impossible 
to build an independent state there. Therefore, according to this logic, unification is the only way 
to protect Ossetian interests. Other important factors which can explain this currently prevailing 
South Ossetian narrative are the population’s fatigue in the face of the incompetence of local 
elites, as well as their aspirations for Russian centralisation.
Many public statements made by South Ossetian politicians on accession to the Russian Federation 
indicate the need for a referendum on this matter. However, some people consider the issue of the 
referendum to be a 'gambling chip' in the hands of local populist politicians, who frequently bring 
the issue up in the run-up to elections. Opponents of the referendum (which is commonly viewed 
as the first step in the process of unification) do not necessarily oppose the idea of unification 
per se; their argument is based on the idea that in the current situation, joining Russia is an 
impossibility. According to this view, accession to Russia is not feasible at this stage, and therefore 
the whole idea of a referendum is a populist strategy, which only distracts people from the real 
problems facing South Ossetia. Since the 2017 presidential elections, the issue of the referendum 
has retreated from its former position as the most intensely discussed issue in domestic South 
Ossetian politics. Because there are no signs of South Ossetia changing the course of its foreign 
policy, a possible explanation lies in Russia’s unpreparedness and unwillingness to take any steps 
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to further integrate South Ossetia into its structures. It is obvious that such a referendum would 
require Russia to take a subsequent stance. After the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbass 
and the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West, any further escalation of tensions with 
Georgia, the EU and the USA would place an excessive burden on Russia – especially considering 
how little Russia would actually gain from incorporating this tiny and economically poor region. 
The decision whether and when such a referendum could take place now apparently lies with 
Moscow. It appears, however, that the current status quo suits Russian interests rather well, so 
Moscow feels no need to rush matters. For the South Ossetian political elite, with its prevailing 
integrationist approach, the next period will presumably be about waiting until the time is right.
Though, the prevailing discourse in South Ossetia is supportive of the idea of unification with 
the Russian Federation, it was not always the case. This can be seen by the results of the 2006 
referendum, where the majority of the population favoured the idea of full sovereignty and 
independence, or in the many statements mentioned above, made by important public figures in 
South Ossetia. The explanation for this ambiguity is that the ideas of independence and unification 
with Russia are not mutually exclusive concepts in South Ossetia. They do in fact, significantly 
overlap each other. The narrative articulated by South Ossetian politicians depicts independence 
as the first step in the process, and unification with Russia as the second. In this sense, the 
situation is not so different from that in Transnistria, where the question in the 2006 independence 
referendum was: 'Do you support the course towards independence for the Transnistrian Moldovan 
Republic and its subsequent free unification with the Russian Federation?' The overwhelming 
majority of Transnistrian voters were in favour of this course. Because similar fuzzy narratives of 
independence versus unification with a kin-state have also been previously documented in other 
de facto states, such as Republika Srpska, Republic of Serbian Krajina or the Nagorno-Karababakh 
Republic, it is not so surprising to read the proclamations made by South Ossetian politicians 
who mention the goal of independence, yet at the same time support accession to the Russian 
Federation.
As is evident from the analysis presented in this article, the aim of seeking international recognition 
of independence is not currently the only goal or the dominant one in South Ossetia. According 
to the research by Kosienkowski (2013 and 2017) and Mikaelian (2017), there are doubts about 
the importance and relevance of this issue also in other former or present-day de facto states 
(such as Tansnistria, Gagauzia and Nagorno-Karabakh). Therefore, is it useful to define de facto 
states as entities seeking international recognition of their independence? The author of this study 
suggests, that it would be better to abandon this way of thinking, because de facto states could 
also seek to join another country or to maintain the status quo. Their aims can also be fuzzy, may 
change in time, and under certain circumstances may also overlap each other. 
Why does this overlap in the independence narrative arise in de facto states? Based on this case 
study of South Ossetia, it could be argued that the narrative of independence mixed with the idea 
of unification with a patron state appears at a condition when: a) independence is perceived in a 
de facto state as a stepping stone to escape from the orbit of a parent state when the ultimate goal 
is merging with a patron state; b) there is not enough will-power for the unification from the side 
of the patron state, because an irredentism would be more burdensome for the patron than formal 
or informal de facto statehood support. However, further comparative research on this topic in 
other de facto states should be conducted to confirm or disprove this more general conclusion.
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